Privacy Policy
Last updated: May 2026
Data we collect
X Article Markdown Paste does not collect, store, or transmit any personal data, browsing data, or article content to our servers.
What the extension accesses
- Clipboard data on
x.com/compose/articles/*: when you press Ctrl+V inside the X article editor, the extension reads the pasted Markdown text from the clipboard. It is parsed and rendered into the editor entirely within your browser. - Image URLs you paste: if your Markdown contains
http(s)image links, the extension's background script fetches each image so it can be uploaded into your X article via X's own media pipeline. Only URLs that you wrote into your Markdown are fetched. - Local image files (optional): if you grant access to a local directory via the File System Access API, the extension reads referenced image files from that directory only when needed for upload. The directory handle is stored in IndexedDB; files themselves never leave your device until X uploads them.
- chrome.storage.local: used solely to store your license activation state, device ID, and a non-sensitive UI preference. Stored locally on your device only.
License validation
License keys are validated against our payment provider (Creem) via a privacy-preserving Cloudflare Worker proxy. The Worker sees only your license key and a randomly-generated device ID — never your name, email, IP-derived location, or any usage data.
What the extension does NOT do
- Does not collect any personal information
- Does not read your X account credentials, cookies, or sessions
- Does not track browsing history
- Does not access pages outside
x.com/*andtwitter.com/* - Does not inject ads or third-party analytics
- Does not transmit your article content to any third party
Third-party services
- X (Twitter): all article writing happens through X's own editor and your active X session. The extension does not impersonate or bypass X.
- Image hosts: when you paste a Markdown link to an external image, that host's server will see one HTTP request — the same as if you visited the image URL directly in your browser.
- Creem (payment processor): handles purchases and license issuance. See Creem's privacy policy.
Data deletion
To delete all extension data, uninstall the extension from chrome://extensions. This removes the license, device ID, and any local preferences. To revoke your license server-side, email lengkuxiaomao@gmail.com.
Contact
For questions about this privacy policy, email lengkuxiaomao@gmail.com.
隐私政策
最后更新:2026 年 5 月
我们收集的数据
X 文章 Markdown 一键导入扩展不收集、存储或将任何个人数据、浏览数据或文章内容传输到我们的服务器。
扩展访问什么
- 在
x.com/compose/articles/*上的剪贴板:你在 X 文章编辑器里按 Ctrl+V 时,扩展读取剪贴板中的 Markdown 文本。所有解析和渲染完全在你浏览器内完成。 - 你粘贴的图片 URL:如果 Markdown 含
http(s)图片链接,扩展的 background 脚本会下载这些图片,再走 X 自己的媒体上传通道传入文章。仅下载你 Markdown 里写的 URL。 - 本地图片文件(可选):如果你通过 File System Access API 授权了本地目录,扩展只在需要时读取该目录里被引用的图片文件。目录句柄存在 IndexedDB,文件本身只在 X 上传时离开你的设备。
- chrome.storage.local:仅存激活状态、设备 ID 和一些非敏感的 UI 偏好。仅本地存储。
激活码校验
激活码通过我们的 Cloudflare Worker 代理向支付平台(Creem)校验。Worker 只看到激活码和随机生成的设备 ID——不会拿到你的姓名、邮箱、IP 推断的位置或任何使用数据。
扩展不会做什么
- 不收集任何个人信息
- 不读取你的 X 账号密码、Cookie 或会话
- 不追踪浏览历史
- 不访问
x.com/*和twitter.com/*之外的页面 - 不注入广告或第三方统计
- 不向任何第三方传输你的文章内容
第三方服务
- X(Twitter):文章写作完全通过 X 自己的编辑器和你的登录态完成,扩展不冒充或绕过 X。
- 图片托管方:你粘贴外链图片时,对方服务器会看到一次 HTTP 请求——跟你直接在浏览器打开该图片 URL 相同。
- Creem(支付平台):处理购买和激活码签发。见 Creem 隐私政策。
删除数据
到 chrome://extensions 卸载扩展即可清除所有本地数据(激活码、设备 ID、UI 偏好)。如需服务端吊销激活码,请邮件 lengkuxiaomao@gmail.com。
联系
关于本隐私政策的问题,请邮件 lengkuxiaomao@gmail.com。